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Abstract
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation—where k manipula-
tors try to manipulate an election on m candidates—under general scoring
rules, with a focus on the Borda protocol. We do so both in the weighted
and unweighted settings.
For these problems, recent approaches to approximation tried to min-
imize k, the number of manipulators needed to make the preferred candi-
date win (thus assuming that the number of manipulators is not limited in
advance), we focus instead on minimizing the maximum score obtainable
by a non-preferred candidate.
In the strongest, most general setting, we provide an algorithm for
any scoring rule as described by a vector ~α = (α1, . . . , αm): for some
β = O(
√
m logm), it obtains an additive approximation equal to W ·
maxi|αi+β − αi|, where W is the sum of voter weights. In words, this
factor is the maximum difference between two scores in ~α that are β
entries away, multiplied by W . The unweighted equivalent is provided as
well.
For Borda, both the weighted and unweighted variants are known to
be NP-hard. For the unweighted case, our simpler algorithm provides
a randomized, additive O(k
√
m logm) approximation; in other words, if
there exists a strategy enabling the preferred candidate to win by an
Ω(k
√
m logm) margin, our method, with high probability, will find a strat-
egy enabling her to win (albeit with a possibly smaller margin). It thus
provides a somewhat stronger guarantee compared to the previous meth-
ods, which implicitly implied (with respect to the original k) a strategy
that provides an Ω(m)-additive approximation to the maximum score of
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a non-preferred candidate: when k is o(
√
m/ logm), our strategy thus
provides a stronger approximation.
For the weighted case, our generalized algorithm provides anO(W
√
m logm)-
additive approximation, where W is the sum of voter weights. This is a
clear advantage over previous methods: some of them do not general-
ize to the weighted case, while others—which approximate the number
of manipulators—pose restrictions on the weights of extra manipulators
added.
We note that our algorithms for Borda can also be viewed as a (1 +
o(1))-multiplicative approximation since the values we approximate have
natural Ω(km) (unweighted) and Ω(Wm) (weighted) lower bounds.
Our methods are novel and adapt techniques from multiprocessor
scheduling by carefully rounding an exponentially-large configuration lin-
ear program that is solved by using the ellipsoid method with an efficient
separation oracle. We believe that such methods could be beneficial in
social choice settings as well.
1 Introduction
Elections are one of the pillars of democratic societies, and are an important
part of social choice theory. In addition they have played a major role in mul-
tiagent systems, where a group of intelligent agents would like to reach a joint
decision [9]. In its essence, an election consists of n agents (also called voters)
who need to decide on a winning candidate among m candidates. In order to
do so, each voter reveals a ranking of the candidates according to his preference
and the winner is then decided according to some protocol.
Ideally in voting, we would like the voters to be truthful, that is, that their
reported ranking of the candidates will be their true one. However, almost
all voting rules are prone to manipulation: Gibbard and Satterthwaite [11, 22]
show that for any reasonable preference-based voting system with at least 3
candidates, voters might benefit from reporting a ranking different than their
true one in order to make sure that the candidate they prefer the most wins.
Furthermore, several voters might decide to collude, to form a coalition and then
to coordinate their votes in such a way that a specific candidate p (hereafter the
preferred candidate) will prevail. Such a setting is reasonable especially when
the voters are agents that are operated by one party of interest.
For some time, the hope for making voting protocols immune to manipula-
tions at least in practice relied on computational assumptions: for several com-
mon voting protocols, it was shown that computing a successful voting strategy
for the manipulators is NP-hard [3, 6, 25, 10]. However, as it is many times the
case, approximation algorithms and heuristics were devised in order to overcome
the NP-hardness albeit with some compromises on the quality of the resulting
strategy. This paper fits within this scheme.
In this paper we focus on general scoring rules R~α and in particular on the
Borda voting rule. We first study the problem of (constructive) unweighted
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coalitional manipulation (UCM )1: assume that k additional voters (hereafter
the manipulators), all of them preferring a specific candidate p, can be added
to the voting system, thus forming a coalition. Also assume that all n original
voters (hereafter the non-manipulators) voted first (or equivalently, that the
non-manipulators are truthful and that their preferences are known). Find a
strategy for the manipulators telling each one of them how to vote so that p
wins, if such strategy exists. We call such a strategy a p-winning strategy. In
the weighted variant (WCM ), the manipulators are weighted; essentially this
means that points awarded by a voter to a candidate are multiplied by the
voter’s weight.
R~α-WCM, for all positional scoring rules R~α, except plurality-like rules, was
shown to be NP-hard when m ≥ 3 [6, 13, 21]. Therefore, Borda-WCM is NP-
hard. Borda-UCM eluded researchers for some time; it was first conjectured
and finally proven to be NP-hard [7, 4].
As a way of overcoming the hardness, recent research [26] focused on an
approximation to the minimum number of manipulators needed to be added to
the system in order to guarantee that the preferred candidate p would win. For
Borda-UCM, they showed that if there exists a p-winning strategy for k manip-
ulators, then they will find a p-winning strategy with at most one additional
manipulator – besides the k given by the problem definition. For Borda-WCM,
they showed that if there exists a p-winning strategy using the k given weighted
manipulators, they will find a p-winning strategy using additional manipulators,
if the sum of weights of the additional manipulators equals the maximum over
the weights of the k original manipulators.
This kind of approximation might seem a bit problematic: first, the ability
to add a manipulator is a strong operation, perhaps too strong; for instance,
for Borda-UCM, adding a manipulator adds Ω(m) to the difference between
p and its highest-scoring competitor. Second, while in some cases it might be
reasonable that the party behind the manipulators can add another manipulator
to the system, in many cases we do not expect this to be true. Furthermore,
in the weighted case assumptions are needed to be made on the weight of the
additional manipulators – also a problematic aspect. Instead, it is interesting
to ask what can we assert—assuming that the number of manipulators cannot
be changed—on the ability to promote a specific candidate p given the non-
manipulator scores of all candidates and the value k (or equivalently, the length-
k vector of manipulator weights).
We provide a positive result of the following type:
Main Result: If there exists a manipulation strategy enabling p to
win by a large-enough margin, we efficiently find a successful ma-
nipulation strategy making p win.
Take the unweighted case as an example: assume that we can provide, for some
function f(k,m), an f(k,m)-additive approximation to the maximum difference
1The problem was called CCUM, for “constructive coalitional unweighted manipulation”,
in [26].
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obtainable between p’s final score and the final score of the highest-scoring non-
preferred candidate. Then, if there exists a p-winning strategy such that this
difference is at least f(k,m), we can be rest-assured that the algorithm will find
a p-winning strategy.
This, in turn, boils down to approximating an upper-bound to the score
of the highest-ranked candidate who is not p. Earlier research of this flavor
focused only on cases where the number of candidates is bounded: for R~α-
WCM, Brelsford et al. [5] provide an FPTAS to that upper bound (to be exact,
they provide an FPTAS to the same exact value we defined, and then use it to
provide another FPTAS to another value, which is their value-of-interest.2) For
R~α-UCM, if the number of candidates is bounded, the entire problem becomes
easy and polynomial-time solvable [6, Proposition 1]. Compared to this line of
work, we do not limit ourselves to bounded number of candidates.
1.1 Our Results and Contributions
Consider a general positional scoring rules R~α, as is usually described by a
vector ~α = (α0, . . . , αm) (see Section 2.1 for full definitions). Now let T
∗ =
minS maxc′∈C\{p} scoreR~α,E,S(c
′) be the minimum possible score (ranging over
all possible manipulation strategies S) of the highest scoring candidate who is
not p, where scoreR~α,E,S(c
′) is the final score of a candidate c′ (w.r.t. voting
rule R~α, election E, and strategy S) and C is the candidate set.
Our main technical contribution is a constructive proof to the following
two theorems. Let β = d
√
m logm for some constant d, and let g(~α) =
maxi=0,...,m−β |αi+β − αi|. In words, g(~α) is the biggest difference between a
score in ~α and another score β entries away from it.
Theorem 1. There exists a randomized Monte Carlo algorithm for R~α-UCM
which provides a k · g(~α)-additive approximation to T ∗ with an exponentially-
small failure probability.
Theorem 2. There exists a randomized Monte Carlo algorithm for R~α-WCM
which provides a W · g(~α)-additive approximation to T ∗ with an exponentially-
small failure probability, where W is the sum of voter weights.
These theorems immediately pave the way to the following corollaries:
Corollary 3. There exists a randomized Monte Carlo algorithm for Borda-
UCM which provides an O(k
√
m logm)-additive approximation to T ∗ with an
exponentially-small failure probability.
Corollary 4. There exists a randomized Monte Carlo algorithm for Borda-
WCM which provides an O(W
√
m logm)-additive approximation to T ∗ with an
exponentially-small failure probability.
2They are interested in the difference between the score of the preferred candidate and
the highest-scoring non-preferred candidate when including the manipulator votes, minus the
same difference when not including the manipulator votes. Notice that the upper-bound we
defined is the only non-trivial value in this computation.
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Taking Borda-UCM as an example, if there exists a p-winning strategy en-
abling p to win by a margin of Ω(k
√
m logm) compared to the score of the
highest-scoring non-preferred candidate, our method will find a p-winning strat-
egy (albeit with a possibly smaller margin). Similar guarantees apply in the
more general settings.
Notice that for Borda, such approximations can also be seen as a (1 + o(1))-
multiplicative approximation on the score of the highest-scoring non-preferred
candidate, and thus is superior to an FPTAS; to see that, notice that for Borda-
WCM the overall ‘voting mass’ given by the manipulators is Ω(Wm2), and so
the highest scoring candidate has score of at least Ω(Wm). Therefore O˜(W
√
m)
3 is a lower order term. This is an advantage over the previous methods:
• Opposed to the heuristics in [8], we provide provable guarantees.
• Also opposed to the heuristics in [8], our algorithm generalizes to the
weighted case.
• Compared to the reverse algorithm of [26] for Borda-UCM, while adding
only a single extra manipulator sounds like a minor operation, it is not;
as mentioned, an extra manipulator implies the addition of Ω(m) points
to the difference between p and its highest-scoring competitor.
• Consider the reverse algorithm of [26], and assume that adding extra
manipulators is not allowed. We will show that their method implies no
better than an Ω(m)-additive approximation to the score of the highest-
scoring non-preferred candidate. Our approximation is thus superior when
k is o(
√
m/ logm).
• Compared to previous methods, are results are linear-programming-based,
and not greedy. Thus, they make a decision based on the entire input,
as opposed to repeatedly making a decision based on a greedy estimate
w.r.t. some subset of the problem.
The following claim analyzes reverse according to our metric. It is proven
in Section 3.
Claim 5. For any m, when the addition of more than k extra manipulators
is not allowed, there are families of cases in which the optimal strategy enables
p to win by a margin of at least m/3, but reverse fails to find a p-winning
strategy.
Our techniques are novel: they employ the use of configuration linear pro-
grams (C-LP), a method that is also used in the scheduling literature, namely for
two well-studied problems, the problem of scheduling on unrelated machines [24],
and the so-called Santa Claus problem [2]. See Section 1.2 for a discussion of
these problems. It is important to note that the solutions to the two above prob-
lems and to ours all differ from one another with respect to how the algorithm
proceeds once the C-LP result is computed.
3The O˜ notation suppresses poly-logarithmic factors.
5
C-LPs are used for the generation of an initial, invalid strategy, which is
later modified to become valid. They are unique in the sense that they are
linear programs that have an exponential number of variables, an issue which
we solve by referring to the LP dual and using the ellipsoid method with a
polynomially-computable separation oracle [17, 12]. We have also implemented
our algorithm: as a result of not finding a library which enables solving an LP
this way, we simulated this by an iterative use of a general LP-solving library,
each time adding a violated constraint based on running the separation oracle
externally.
1.2 Related Work
Borda. The Borda voting mechanism was introduced by Jean-Charles de
Borda in 1770. It is used, sometimes with some modifications, by parliaments
in countries such as Slovenia, and competitions such as the Eurovision song
contest, selecting the MVP in major league baseball, Robocup robot soccer
competitions and others. The Borda voting mechanism is described as follows:
every agent ranks the candidates from 1 to m, and awards the candidate ranked
i-th a score of m − i. Notice that this makes the scores given by each single
voter a permutation of 0, . . . ,m − 1. Finally, the winning candidate is the one
with the highest aggregate score.
Easiness Results. The computational complexity of coalitional manipulation
problems was studied extensively. For general scoring rules R~α, most earlier
work considered the case where the number of candidates is bounded: Conitzer
at al. [6] show that when m is bounded, R~α-UCM is solvable in polynomial
time.
Even when m is unbounded, Plurality-UCM and Veto-UCM are still easy
using the greedy algorithm of Zuckerman et al. [26]. This also holds for t-
approval-UCM, which generalizes both [19].
NP-Hardness Results. In the weighted case, the situation is different: for
all positional scoring rules R~α, except plurality-like rules, R~α-WCM is NP-hard
when m ≥ 3 [6, 13, 21]. In particular, this holds for Borda-WCM.
However, the computational hardness of Borda-UCM still remained open for
quite some time, until finally shown to be NP-hard as well [7, 4] in 2011, even
for the case of n = 3 and adding 2 manipulators.
Approximating the number of manipulators. Zuckerman et al. [26] present
a greedy algorithm later referred to as reverse4. reverse works as follows:
after the non-manipulators had finished voting, we go over the manipulators
one by one, and each manipulator will rank the candidates (besides p) by the
reversed order of their aggregated score so far (candidate with the highest score
so far gets the lowest ranking). As mentioned, for Borda-UCM, reverse can be
4This name was given in [7].
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seen as an additive +1 approximation for the objective of finding the minimum
number of manipulators needed.
For Borda-WCM, their approximation has the following flavor. Let S be the
set of the k given weighted manipulators. If there exists a p-winning strategy
using S, they will find a p-winning strategy using additional manipulators, if
the sum of weights of the additional manipulators equals max`∈S w`, where w`
is the weight of manipulator ` ∈ S.
Approximating the Maximum Score of a Non-Preferred Candidate.
Returning to earlier results, when m is bounded, Brelsford et al. [5, Lemma
3] provide an FPTAS with respect to the maximum score of a non-preferred
candidate. As mentioned, this paves the way for an FPTAS on their value-of-
interest.
Heuristics for Borda. Davies et al. [8] present two additional heuristics:
iteratively, assign the largest un-allocated score to the candidate with the largest
gap (Largest Fit), or to the candidate with the largest ratio of gap divided
by the number of scores yet-to-be-allocated to this candidate (Average Fit).
To the best of our knowledge, these algorithms do not have a counterpart for
the weighted case.
Configuration Linear Programs. As discussed, configuration linear pro-
grams were also used in scheduling literature, for example for the following two
problems which were extensively studied before:
• In the so-called Santa Claus problem [2], Santa Claus has t presents that
he wishes to distribute between m kids, and pi,j is the value that kid i has
to present j. The goal is to maximize the happiness of the least happy
kid: mini
∑
j∈Si pi,j , where Si is the presents allocated to kid i.
• In the problem of scheduling on unrelated machines [24]. We need to assign
t jobs between m machines, and pi,j is the time required for machine i to
execute job j. The goal is to minimize the makespan maxi
∑
j∈Si pi,j ,
where Si is the jobs assigned to machine i.
Both papers researched a natural and well-researched ‘restricted assignment’
variant of the two problems where pi,j ∈ {pj , 0}. In [2], they obtained an
O(log logm/ log log logm)-multiplicative approximation to the first problem and
in [24], they obtained a (33/17 + )-multiplicative approximation to the second.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Problem Definition
Candidate Set. With a slight change of notation, let C = {c0, c1, . . . , cm} be
a candidate set consisting of the preferred candidate p = c0 and the other m
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candidates c1, . . . , cm. Note that we changed the notation so that the overall
number of candidates is m+ 1; this will help streamline the writing.
Election. An election E = (C, V ) is defined by a candidate set C and a set of
voters V where each voter submits a ranking of the candidates according to its
preference. Formally, we define V = {1, . . . ,n}, where each `∈ V is a total
order of the candidates. For example, c1 ` p ` c2 is one such possible order
if C = {p, c1, c2}. Then, some decision rule R is applied in order to decide on
the winner(s); formally R(E) ⊆ C is the set of winners of the elections. In the
specific case of a positional scoring rule R~α, the rule is described by a vector
~α = (α0, α1, . . . , αm) for which α0 ≤ α1 ≤ · · · ≤ αm, and αm is polynomial in
m, used as follows: each voter awards αi to the candidate ranked (m − i)-th5.
Finally, the winning candidate is the one with the highest aggregated score. In
the specific case of Borda scoring rule, we have that ~α = (0, 1, . . . ,m− 1,m).
WCM and UCM. In the R~α-(constructive) weighted coalitional manipula-
tion (R~α-WCM) problem, we are given as input:
• A score profile vector (σ0, σ1, . . . , σm) representing the aggregated scores
given so far to each candidate in C by the original voters in an election
E under the rule R~α. Notice that (σ0, σ1, . . . , σm) eliminates the need
for obtaining E as input: as we have no control on the truthful voters
V , (σ0, σ1, . . . , σm) is thus a sufficient representation for the outcome of
non-manipulator votes.
• A vector ~w = (w1, . . . , wk) of positive integers representing the weights
of k manipulators who will be added to the election. The weights have
the following meaning: each manipulator ` = 1, . . . , k is replaced by w`
identical but unweighted copies of himself.
It then should be determined if when adding the k manipulators then either
(a) no strategy under R~α exists in which p wins, or that (b) there exists a voting
strategy under R~α such that p can win. In this case, the algorithm should find
it. R~α-(constructive) unweighted coalitional manipulation (R~α-UCM) is the
specific case where ~w is the all-ones vector and therefore can be replaced in the
input by the integer k.
Manipulation Matrices. Note that in case (b), the output is a voting strat-
egy S which can be represented as a k× (m+ 1) matrix in which the entry S`,i
describes the score given by manipulator ` to candidate ci, and where each row
of S is a permutation of ~α. Such a representation is also called a manipulation
matrix. We can relax the requirement that each row of S is a permutation,
and replace it by the requirement that each score-type αj , is repeated exactly
k times in S. Such a matrix is called a relaxed manipulation matrix. We can
5Usually ~α is defined in a descending manner, such that α0 ≥ α1 ≥ · · · ≥ αm, and αi is
awarded to the candidate ranked i-th. Our choice helps streamline the presentation.
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perform this relaxation as Davies et al. [8, Theorem 7] show that each relaxed
manipulation matrix can be rearranged to become a valid manipulation matrix
while preserving each candidate’s final score.
High Probability. Throughout the paper, when we use the term ‘with high
probability’, we mean an arbitrarily-chosen polynomially-small failure probabil-
ity, i.e., success probability of the form 1−m−d where d ≥ 1 is a constant that
can be chosen without affecting the asymptotic running time. ‘Failure’ refers
to the event that the algorithm does not provide the desired approximation
guarantee.
In this paper we will use various forms of the Hoeffding inequalities, which
are variants of the Chernoff inequalities:
Generalized Hoeffding inequality [14, Theorem 2]. Let X1, . . . , Xm be
independent random variables where each Xi is bounded by the interval [ai, bi]
respectively. Let X =
∑m
i=1Xi and X¯ = X/m. Then
Pr[X¯ − E[X¯] ≥ t] ≤ exp
(
− 2n
2t2∑m
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
.
By redefining the above inequality in terms of the sum X (instead of the mean
X¯) and defining λ = tm we derive the following equivalent formulation:
Pr[X − E[X] ≥ λ] ≤ exp
(
− 2λ
2∑m
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
.
Specifically, when Xi ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain the following ‘classic’ Hoeffding in-
equality, which is equivalent to [14, Theorem 1]:
Pr[X − E[X] ≥ λ] ≤ exp
(
−2λ
2
m
)
.
2.2 Reduction to a Pure Min-Max Problem
Since we know what will be the final score of p (non-manipulator votes are known
and each manipulator will give p the maximum score possible), we can effectively
discard p and treat the problem as a minimization problem on the final scores
of c1, . . . , cm only. In other words, we focus on finding minS maxc′∈C\{p} s(c′) =
minS maxi=1,...,m s(ci), where s(c
′) is c′’s final score. Thus the output S is
actually a k ×m relaxed manipulation matrix.
Another thing to note is that we can not assume anything about the values in
the initial score profile (σ0, σ1, . . . , σm); this follows from [8, Lemma 1], where
it is shown that in the context of Borda, for any given non-negative integer
vector (σ0, σ1, . . . , σm), we can define a set of non-manipulators (along with
their preferences) and an additional candidate cm+1 that will induce an initial
score profile (T ′+σ1, . . . , T ′+σm, y) for some values T ′ and y < T ′. Since such
an additive translation and the addition of a candidate that will be awarded less
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than any other candidate have no influence on the winner (and on the difference
between each two candidates’ final scores), and since our results are concerned
with an additive approximation, we should assume no prior limitation on the
nature of values in (σ0, σ1, . . . , σm).
3 Lower Bound for REVERSE
We start by showing that there are cases in which the reverse algorithm for
Borda gives only an Ω(m)-additive approximation to minimum final score of the
highest-scoring non-preferred candidate.
Proof of Claim 5. We provide an infinite family of cases where the claim holds.
Let k = 3 and let m = 3t for some integer t. Consider the case where after
the non-manipulators voted, all candidates (but p) have the same score σi = s
for all i. Effectively this can be normalized to (σ1, . . . , σm) = ~0.
By the reverse algorithm, the first manipulator can award c1, . . . , cm with
0, . . . ,m− 1 respectively, after which the second manipulator will be obliged to
award c1, . . . , cm with m − 1, . . . , 0 respectively. Repeat this process with the
rest of the manipulators, until the final one. It can be verified that cm will end
up with the maximal score of dk/2e(m− 1) = 2(m− 1).
Conversely, as an upper bound for an optimal solution, consider the following
strategy: place all scores to be given in a descending sequence, that is the
sequence 〈m − 1,m − 1,m − 1,m − 2,m − 2,m − 2, . . . , 0, 0, 0〉. Give the first
m scores in the sequence to c1, . . . , cm respectively, the next m to cm, . . . , c1
respectively, and the last m to c1, . . . , cm respectively. Since every score-type has
3 copies, we have just described a relaxed manipulation matrix and therefore by
Davies et al. [8, Theorem 7] it can be rearranged to become a valid manipulation
matrix without changing the final score of each candidate. Now notice that the
score given to any candidate is of the form (m−r)+(m/3+r−1)+(m/3−r) =
5m/3 − r − 1 for some r ∈ {1, . . . ,m/3}. As this is at most 5m/3 − 2 (when
r = 1), the difference is thus m/3 = Ω(m).
4 Linear Programming for UCM
We will begin by providing a “natural” way to formulate the min-max version
of the problem as an Integer Program (IP). As solving IPs is NP-hard, we will
relax it to the equivalent Linear Program (LP). However, such a natural LP will
not be useful in our setting, and we will thus introduce a totally different LP
formulation, called Configuration Linear Programming (C-LP). The number of
variables in the C-LP is exponential in the size of the input. Nevertheless, we
show that our C-LP can be solved in polynomial time.
Let [m] = {1, . . . ,m} and [m]0 = {0, . . . ,m − 1}. We define the variables
xi,j for (i, j) ∈ [m] × [m]0, and the variable T , with the intent that xi,j will
equal the number of times candidate ci received a score of αj , and T will serve
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as the upper-bound on each candidate final aggregate score. The IP can then
be stated as follows:
min
~x
T
subject to:
m∑
i=1
xi,j = k ∀j ∈ [m]0 , (1)
m−1∑
j=0
xi,j = k ∀i ∈ [m] , (2)
m−1∑
j=0
αjxi,j ≤ T − σi ∀i ∈ [m] , (3)
xi,j ∈ {0, . . . , k} ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [m]0 , (4)
where (1) guarantees that every score was awarded k times, (2) guarantees
that every candidate was given k scores, and (3) guarantees that every candidate
gets at most T points.
It should be noted that when treating the problem as a min-max problem,
we need to take T as a variable that we wish to minimize (this is done by the
objective function). However, if we consider the original definition in which our
aim is to make the preferred candidate p win, T can be set to σ0 + kαm (the
final score of the preferred candidate), and the IP will not have an objective
function.
4.1 Integrality Gap of the Natural LP
While we can relax this IP into an LP by replacing the set in the last constraint
to be the continuous interval [0, k], it will not be as helpful. We will shortly
show why; however note that as this sub-section relates to the deficiencies of
the original LP formulation, it can be safely skipped and is not needed for the
full understanding of our algorithms.
Consider a “pure” LP rounding algorithm, applied w.l.o.g. to a minimization
problem. Such an algorithm works as follows: given an instance of a problem,
it solves its associated relaxed LP (the problem’s natural IP where integrality
constraints are replaced with their continuous counterparts) and then rounds
the resulting solution in some way or the other such that a valid (non-necessarily
optimal) solution to the original IP is obtained. The approximation analysis of
such algorithms is based on reasoning about how worse is the objective value
of the rounded solution compared to the fractional one. In other words, what
is the increase—or “damage done”—to the optimum objective incurred by the
rounding process. Since the fractional optimum of a relaxed LP is a lower bound
to the integral optimum, i.e., the optimum of the original problem, the same fac-
tor also upper-bounds the difference between the objective value of the rounded
solution and the one of the integral optimum. Thus this process derives an
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approximation guarantee. We show that in our case, the increase can be Ω(m),
by showing that there are cases in which the difference between the integral
and fractional optimum objective values is Ω(m), and thus an algorithm solely
based on the rounding procedure cannot hope for an o(m) additive approxima-
tion. This kind of reasoning is known as an integrality gap, and is demonstrated
by the following:
Lemma 6. For Borda-UCM, an algorithm based solely on rounding the relaxed
natural LP cannot obtain o(m) additive approximation.
Proof. We show a lower bound on the approximation ratio in the form of an
additive integrality gap. In other words, we show an infinite family of instances
where the integral solution to the LP (and thus, to the original problem) gives
Ω(m) worse objective value when compared to the fractional solution.
Consider the simple case of m candidates, all having equal initial score
(w.l.o.g. σi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m) and a single manipulator. When solving the
problem, one candidate will be awarded m− 1 and thus will have final score of
m−1. However, in the fractional solution, the optimum is obtained by splitting
each score equally, that is, setting xi,j = 1/m for every i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [m]0.
Now every candidate obtained a final score of 1/m · ∑m−1j=0 j = (m − 1)/2.
Therefore notice that the gap between the objective of the integral and frac-
tional solutions is (m− 1)/2 = Ω(m).
4.2 Introducing Configuration LPs
In order to work around this we will have to resort to a totally different approach,
in which variables no longer represent score types, and instead represent the set
of scores (configuration) that can be awarded to a candidate.
Formally, a configuration C for some candidate ci is a vector of dimension
m in which Cj represents a number of scores of type αj that i has received, and
for which
∑m−1
j=0 Cj = k, that is, the overall number of scores awarded is k. For
a candidate ci and a bound T , let Ci(T ) be the set of configurations that do not
cause the candidate overall score to surpass T , i.e., the set of configurations C
for which
∑m−1
j=0 Cjαj ≤ T − σi.
We formulate the configuration LP as follows:∑
C∈Ci(T )
xi,C ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [m] , (5)
∑
i,C
C∈Ci(T )
Cjxi,C ≥ k ∀j ∈ [m]0 , (6)
xi,C ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [m], C ∈ Ci(T ) . (7)
where we wish that the xi,C ’s would serve as indicator variables indicating
whether or not ci was awarded with configuration C, (5) guarantees that every
candidate was given at most 1 configuration and (6) guarantees that every score
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was awarded at least k times. The choice of inequalities over equalities will be
explained soon.
Example 1. Consider the case where k = 2, m = 5, ~α = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) (i.e.,
Borda) and (σ1, . . . , σ5) = (5, 6, 6, 6, 7). We are omitting the non-manipulator
votes that provided ~σ, however recall that there is a possible non-manipulator
voting yielding any ~σ up to an additive factor and an addition of a candidate.
Now assume T = 10 (this is indeed the optimum). Let us focus on the last
candidate c5. C5(T ) should therefore contain all configurations which award c5
at most T − σ5 = 3 points. Those configurations are (2, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0 points),
(1, 1, 0, 0, 0) (1 point), (0, 2, 0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1, 0, 0) (2 points), and (1, 0, 0, 1, 0) (3
points).
When solving the C − LP , only two of her configurations will get non-zero
value: x5,(1,0,0,1,0) u 0.7 and x5,(0,1,1,0,0) u 0.3. We omit the variables corre-
sponding to the rest of the candidates.
After solving the LP, we will execute a rounding procedure that will trans-
form the fractional LP solution into a valid solution for the original problem.
This procedure can increase the score of some of the candidates, and hence we
wish to start with the smallest possible T (so that even after the increase the
final score will hopefully be bounded by σ0 + kαm).
To find the smallest possible T , we perform a one-sided binary search on
the value of T . For this purpose, for each possible value of T that we come
across during the binary search, we redefine the LP and then solve the new LP
from scratch, and see if it has a valid solution. The reason we do not add T
as a variable in an objective function (instead of the binary search) is that the
number of summands in Equations (5,6) depends on T .
This formulation has the obvious drawback that the number of variables is
exponential in k. However, following the approach of [2], if we find a polynomially-
computable separation oracle we can solve the LP by referring to the LP dual
and using the ellipsoid method. Such an oracle will require a solution to the
following seemingly unrelated problem as a subroutine: a variant of the classic
Knapsack problem.
4.3 k-Multiset Knapsack
Let {1, . . . ,m} be a set of distinct items, where each item has an associated
value vj and a weight wj . We also obtain a weight upper-bound W and a value
lower-bound V . As opposed to ordinary knapsack, we also obtain an integer k.
We are required to find a multiset S of exactly k items (i.e., we can repeat items
from the item-set), such that S’s overall weight is at most W and S’s overall
value is greater than V (or to return that no such multiset exists).
Lemma 7. The k-multiset knapsack can be solved in time polynomial in k, m,
and W (which is pseudo-polynomial due to the dependence on W ).
Proof. We fill out a table Q[w, `], for w = 0, . . . ,W and ` = 0, . . . , k, in
which Q[w, `] is the highest value obtainable with a size-` multiset of items
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of aggregate-weight at most w. Notice that Q can be filled using the following
recursion:
Q[w, `] =
{
0 if ` = 0,
maxj vj +Q
′(w − wj , `− 1) otherwise,
(8)
where Q′(w, `) = Q[w, `] if it is defined, i.e., w ≥ 0 and ` ≥ 0, and otherwise is
−∞.
Therefore Q can be filled-out using dynamic programming. Finally, the entry
Q[W,k] contains the highest value obtainable with overall weight at most W .
Therefore, if Q[W,k] > V , we have found a required multiset; otherwise such
does not exists. The resulting multiset itself can be recovered using backtracking
on the table Q. Noticed that the amount of work done is O(Wkm).
4.4 Solving the UCM C-LP
We return to our problem. The choice of inequalities over equalities is motivated
by our use of the LP dual in Theorem 9. However, they have the same effect as
equalities, as shown by the following lemma:
Lemma 8. In a solution to the above C-LP, Equations (5,6) will actually be
equalities.
Proof. Notice that by Equation (6):
km ≤
m−1∑
j=0
m∑
i=1
∑
C∈Ci(T )
Cjxi,C (9)
=
m∑
i=1
∑
C∈Ci(T )
xi,C
m−1∑
j=0
Cj (10)
= k
m∑
i=1
∑
C∈Ci(T )
xi,C (11)
≤ km (12)
where (12) holds by plugging (5) into (11). We therefore obtain that
m−1∑
j=0
m∑
i=1
∑
C∈Ci(T )
Cjxi,C = km
which forces both above non-trivial LP inequalities to be equalities.
Theorem 9. Given a fixed value T , the UCM C-LP can be solved in polynomial
time.
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Proof. We need to refer to the LP dual for our C-LP in order to solve it; we
briefly repeat some LP duality concepts here, refer to [23] for complete defini-
tions and discussion.
The dual of a maximization problem is a minimization problem. In order to
define it we can treat our primal program as a maximization problem having
all coefficients 0 in its objective function. In the dual there is a variable for
every constraint of the primal, and a constraint for every variable of the primal.
Therefore, we define a variable yi for each candidate ci and a variable zj for
each score-type αj (since the primal has a constraint for each candidate ci and
for each score-type αj). However, since our primal has an exponential number
of variables, the dual will have an exponential number of constraints. We will
show how to address this.
In short, the non-trivial constraints are then obtained by transposing the
constraint-coefficient matrix of the primal, using the primal objective function
coefficients as the right-hand side of the dual constraints, and using right-hand
side of the primal constraints as the coefficients of the dual objective function.
The process yields the following dual:
min
~y,~z
m∑
i=1
yi − k
m−1∑
j=0
zj
subject to:
m−1∑
j=0
Cjzj ≤ yi ∀i ∈ [m], C ∈ Ci(T )
yi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
zj ≥ 0 ∀j = 0, . . . ,m− 1
As mentioned, the dual has an exponential number of constraints. However
it is solvable; the ellipsoid method [17] is a method for solving an LP which
iteratively tries to find a point inside the feasible region described by the con-
straints. However, we do not need to provide all the constraints in advance.
Instead, the algorithm can be provided with a subroutine, called a separation
oracle, to which it calls with a proposed point, and the subroutine then either
confirms that the point is inside the feasible region or that it returns a violated
constraint [12]. The ellipsoid method algorithm performs a polynomial number
of iterations, therefore if the separation oracle runs in polynomial time as well,
the LP is solved in overall polynomial time. Notice that the polynomial num-
ber of iterations performed by the ellipsoid method implies that the number of
constraints that played a part in finding the optimum (known as active con-
straints) was polynomial as well. In other words, we could effectively discard
all the constraints but a polynomial number of them.
As discussed, a separation oracle for the dual, given a proposed solution
(~y;~z), needs to find in polynomial time a violated constraint, if exists. It remains
to show that such a separation oracle is polynomial-time computable.
Observe that a violated constraint to this program is a pair i, C for which C ∈
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Ci(T ) (and therefore
∑m−1
j=0 Cjαj ≤ T −σi) and at the same time
∑m−1
j=0 Cjzj >
yi. Fortunately, for a specified i, finding a configuration C that induces a
violated constraint can be seen as finding a k-multiset (since
∑m−1
j=0 Cj = k)
given by a solution to our knapsack variant: [m]0 is the item set (over which j
ranges), the value for the item j is zj , while its weight is αj . The given value
lower bound is yi, and T−σi is the given upper bound on the weight. Effectively,
we use the possibly-tighter weight bound min{kαm−1, T−σi} instead, as kαm−1
bounds the overall weight obtainable with a size-k multiset. As now the weight
bound is polynomial in m and k, the solution to our knapsack variant becomes
polynomial.
We repeat this knapsack-solving step for each i until we find a violated
constraint, or conclude that no constraint is violated. Once we have solved the
dual using the ellipsoid method with the separation oracle, we can discard all
variables in the primal that do not correspond to violated constraints of the dual,
since the inclusion of those constraints (resp. their corresponding variables) did
not have any effect on the dual optimum (resp. the primal optimum).6 The
primal now contains only a polynomial number of variables and can be solved
directly using the ellipsoid method or any other known polynomial solvers for
LP, such as [15].
5 Algorithm for UCM
Solve the above mentioned configuration-LP formulation as described in Sec-
tion 4. As mentioned, while both constraints are inequalities, in any solution
they will actually be equalities. For each candidate ci, observe the variables
xi,C , C ∈ Ci(T ). Since
∑
C∈Ci(T ) xi,C = 1, treat the xi,C ’s as a distribution over
the configurations for i and randomly choose one according to that distribution.
For the time being, give ci this configuration.
While every candidate now has a valid configuration (and her score does not
exceed T ), it is possible that the number of scores of a certain type is above or
below k. Formally, if candidate ci received a configuration C
i, let the array H
such that H[j] =
∑m
i=1 C
i
j be the histogram of the scores. It is then possible that
H[j] 6= k. If we would translate the configuration given to each candidate to
the list of the scores awarded within it, and would write this list as the column
of a matrix, this matrix might not be a relaxed manipulation matrix. In order
to solve this, we need to replace some of scores in this matrix with others such
that the number of scores of each type will be k. On the other hand, we need
to make sure this process does not add much to the score of each candidate.
Let t = (i, j) be a tuple representing the event that candidate ci received a
score of αj in its configuration. Place all such tuples in a single multiset (if αj
is awarded to i more than once, repeat (i, j) as needed). Now sort this multiset
6In other words, the dual of the dual without the discarded constraints is the primal
without their corresponding variables. Another way to explain this is that this is exactly the
complementary slackness condition of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions [16, 18], a necessary
condition for obtaining the optimum.
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Algorithm 1: Approximation algorithm.
1 Solve the C-LP as described in Section 4
2 foreach i do define distribution q s.t. q(C) = xi,C for all C ∈ Ci(T ) and
randomly choose Ci ∼ q.
3 L← 〈〉 /* L is the empty list */
4 foreach i ∈ [m], j ∈ [m]0 do
5 Append Cij copies of (i, j) to L /* j represents the score type
αj */
6 Sort L in an ascending order by ScoreIndex(·) /* ScoreIndex(t) = j if
t = (i, j) */
7 Re-index L such that L = 〈t0, . . . , tkm−1〉
8 for ` = 0, . . . , km− 1 do
9 Observe tuple t` = (i, j)
/* Assign the score αb`/kc to ci, instead of the previous
αj: */
10 Cij ← Cij − 1
11 Cib`/kc ← Cib`/kc + 1
12 return the relaxed manipulation matrix corresponding to C1, . . . , Cm
according to the αj value in an non-decreasing manner (break ties between
candidates arbitrarily) thus creating the event-sequence t0, . . . , tkm−1, i.e., the
tuples are now indexed by their rank in this sequence. We now start the actually
fixing of the scores given; for each tuple t` = (i, j) having rank ` in the list, we
change the score awarded to ci (as described by the tuple) from αj to αb`/kc. To
perform this change in the algorithm, it is enough to set Cij ← Cij − 1 followed
by setting Cib`/kc ← Cib`/kc+ 1. This is correct as Cij′ , for any j′, represents the
number of αj′ scores awarded to ci.
Notice that now every score is repeated k times (there are only k possible
` values mapping to the same b`/kc value). Finally, the corrected configura-
tions represent the final strategy. This can be easily represented as a relaxed
configuration matrix by referring to the matrix [MS(C1); · · · ; MS(Cm)], where
MS(Ci) is a column constructed by taking the configuration Ci, represented as
an ordered-multiset of scores (each j repeats Cij times), in some arbitrary order.
The entire process is summarized as Algorithm 1.
Let β = d
√
m logm for some constant d. Let g(~α) = maxi=0,...,m−β αi+β−αi.
In words, g(~α) is the biggest different between a score in ~α and another score β
entries away from it.
Lemma 10. Let C ∈ {C1, . . . , Cm} be a configuration obtained for some can-
didate by the rounding process, and let C ′ be its corrected version given by the
process described above. Then with arbitrary-chosen polynomially-small failure
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probability,
m−1∑
j=0
αjC
′
j ≤
m−1∑
j=0
αjCj + k · g(~α) .
.
Proof. Let H be the histogram of the original configurations C1, . . . , Cm, and
let the array G be the array of histogram partial sums, i.e., G[j] =
∑j
j′=0H[j
′].
In a similar manner, define Di[j] =
∑j
j′=0 C
i
j′ to be the partial sums array w.r.t.
each candidate ci. We will show that with high probability, G[j] ≤ (j + 1)k +
dk
√
m lnm.
Fix a specific j. Notice that
E[G[j]] =
j∑
j′=0
E[H[j′]] =
j∑
j′=0
∑
i,C
C∈Ci(T )
Cj′xi,C = (j + 1)k
according to the LP constraints, and that G[j] =
∑m
i=1D
i[j], that is, G[j] is a
random variable which is the sum of the independent random variables Di[j]
for i = 1, . . . ,m. In addition, for every candidate ci, it holds that D
i[j] ∈ [0, k],
as a configuration contains at most k scores. Therefore, using the generalized
Hoeffding inequality [14, Theorem 2]:
Pr [G[j]− E[G[j]] ≥ λ] ≤ exp
(
− 2λ
2∑m
i=1 k
2
)
= exp
(
− 2λ
2
mk2
)
.
Setting λ = d′k
√
m lnm, for some arbitrary constant d′, we get that Pr[G[j]−
E[G[j]] ≥ d′k√m lnm] ≤ 1/md′ , that is, the probability that we deviate from
E[G[j]] by more than O˜(k
√
m) can be made arbitrarily polynomially small.
Using the union bound, the same can be made to hold for all j = 0, . . . ,m− 1
simultaneously.
Now observe a tuple t` = (i, j
′) before being possibly corrected by the al-
gorithm. Since its rank ` in the sorted sequence is at most the number of
scores whose type is at most j′, which is by definition G[j′], we get that
` ≤ G[j′] ≤ (j′ + 1)k + d′k√m lnm, where the second inequality holds with
high probability. Therefore by the algorithm changing the score αj′ to αb`/kc,
the score increases by at most αb`/kc − αj′ ≤ α(j′+1)+d′√m lnm − αj′ ≤ g(~α).
Now observe some candidate ci with a given configuration C
i corrected to
become a configuration C ′ by the algorithm. Since at worst case, all of ci’s
k scores where affected as such, her overall score has increased by at most
kg(~α).
Corollary 11. The above algorithm provides an additive kg(~α) approximation
with high probability. By repeating the randomized rounding procedure a linear
number of times, the failure probability becomes exponentially-small. The overall
running time is polynomial.
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Proof. Let T ∗ be the optimal value for the original problem, and let TCLP be
the best bound obtainable via the above C-LP combined with the binary search
on T . Notice that TCLP ≤ T ∗, as the optimal solution is also a valid solution
for the C-LP. Now observe the highest scoring candidate in the C-LP. When
the algorithm terminates, we get that with high-probability her score is TCLP +
kg(~α) ≤ T ∗ + kg(~α). If we repeat the randomized rounding procedure a linear
number of times and pick the iteration yielding the minimum addition to TCLP,
the probability of not getting a kg(~α)-approximation becomes exponentially-
small.
As the additional score given by the algorithm to any other candidate is also
kg(~α), the bound T ∗ + kg(~α) holds for all candidates. We conclude that this is
indeed an kg(~α) additive approximation.
As discussed, solving the C-LP is done in polynomial time (by the polynomial
number of iterations of the ellipsoid method and the polynomial runtime of the
k-multiset knapsack separation oracle). The rounding is dominated by going
over a polynomial number of non-zero variables of the C-LP and is therefore
polynomial as well. It is repeated a linear number fo times in order to provide
an exponentially-small failure probability.
From here we can directly obtain Corollary 3:
Proof of Corollary 3. By noticing that for Borda, g(~α) = O(
√
m logm).
6 Linear Programming for WCM
When turning to the WCM problem, the ‘natural’ LP still suffers from the
deficiencies described in Section 4. We again resort to using configurations.
However, configurations will now be defined in a different manner, since now,
when each voter has an associated weight, voters are not identical anymore and
therefore our configurations need to capture the identity of the voters.
A configuration C for some candidate ci is now defined as a length-k sequence
in which C` = j if the voter ` awarded αj to ci. For a candidate ci and a bound
T , Ci(T ) is again the set of configurations that do not cause the candidate overall
score to surpass T , which this time is formally
∑k
`=1 w`αC` ≤ T − σi.
The configuration LP is now formulated as follows:∑
C∈Ci(T )
xi,C ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [m] , (13)
∑
i,C∈Ci(T )
C`=j
xi,C ≥ 1 ∀j ∈ [m]0,∀` ∈ [k] , (14)
xi,C ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [m], C ∈ Ci(T ) . (15)
Again, we wish that the xi,C ’s would serve as indicator variables indicating
whether or not ci was awarded with configuration C, (13) guarantees that every
candidate was given at most 1 configuration and (14) guarantees that every
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score was awarded by every voter at least once. The choice of inequalities over
equalities will be explained soon.
We present another—much more complex—Knapsack variant, which will be
used later by the separration orcale needed for solcing the C-LP.
6.1 k-Sequence Knapsack
Let {1, . . . ,m} be a set of distinct items. In the k-sequence knapsack problem
we are required to construct a length-k sequence S = s1, . . . , sk of items; we
can repeat items from the item-set, however, we are subject to some additional
constraints as will be specified immediately. The input to the problem is the
following:
• A value v(j, `), for every j ∈ [m]0, ` ∈ [k] where v(j, `) is the value obtained
by placing item j at location ` in the sequence.
• A cost b(j) for each item j, and a penalty p` for each location ` ∈ [k].
Placing an item j at location ` in the sequence has a penalized-cost p`b(j),
i.e., it depends on both the item’s weight and the penalty for location `.
• A value lower-bound V .
• A penalized-cost upper-bound B.
The resulting sequence S should abide the following constraints:
• S’s overall value ∑k`=1 v(s`, `) is greater than V .
• S’s overall penalized-cost ∑k`=1 p`b(s`) is at most B.
If such sequence S exists, we should return it; otherwise we return that no such
sequence exists.
Lemma 12. The k-sequence knapsack can be solved in time polynomial in k,m,
and B (which is pseudo-polynomial due to the dependence on B).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 7, we fill out a table Q[b′, `], for b′ =
0, . . . , B and ` = 0, . . . , k, in which Q[b′, `] is the highest value obtainable with
a length-` sequence of items of penalized-cost at most b. This time Q is filled
using a different recursion:
Q[b′, `] =
{
0 if ` = 0,
maxj v(j, `) +Q
′(b′ − p`b(j), `− 1) otherwise,
(16)
where Q′(b′, `) = Q[b′, `] if it is defined, i.e., b′ ≥ 0 and ` ≥ 0, and otherwise is
−∞.
Therefore Q can be filled-out using dynamic programming. Finally, the en-
try Q[B, k] contains the highest value obtainable with overall cost at most B.
Therefore, if Q[B, k] > V , we have found a required sequence; otherwise such
does not exists. The resulting sequence itself can be recovered using backtrack-
ing on the table Q. Noticed that the amount of work done is O(Bkm).
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6.2 Solving the WCM C-LP
We return to our problem. Again, the choice of inequalities over equalities is
motivated by our use of the LP dual in Theorem 14. However, they have the
same effect as equalities, as shown by the following lemma:
Lemma 13. In a solution to the above C-LP, Equations (13,14) will actually
be equalities.
Proof. Notice that by Equation (14):
km ≤
∑
j,`
m∑
i=1
∑
C∈Ci(T )
C`=j
xi,C (17)
=
m∑
i=1
∑
C∈Ci(T )
∑
`,j
C`=j
xi,C (18)
=
m∑
i=1
∑
C∈Ci(T )
xi,C
∑
`,j
C`=j
1 (19)
= k
m∑
i=1
∑
C∈Ci(T )
xi,C (20)
≤ km (21)
where (21) holds by plugging (13) into (20). We therefore obtain that
∑
j,`
m∑
i=1
∑
C∈Ci(T )
xi,C = km
which forces both above non-trivial LP inequalities to be equalities.
Theorem 14. Given a fixed value T , the WCM C-LP can be solved in polyno-
mial time.
Proof. We again refer to the LP-dual, which this time is:
min
~y,~z
m∑
i=1
yi −
∑
j,`
zj,`
subject to:∑
j,`
C`=j
zj,` ≤ yi ∀i ∈ [m], C ∈ Ci(T )
yi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
zj,` ≥ 0 ∀(j, `) ∈ [m]0 × [k]
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Furthermore, the above single non-trivial constraint can be more conveniently
re-written as
k∑
`=1
zC`,` ≤ yi ∀i ∈ [m], C ∈ Ci(T ) .
We again turn to the ellipsoid method with a separation oracle; this time, a
violated constraint to this program is a pair i, C for which C ∈ Ci(T ) (and
therefore
∑k
`=1 w`αC` ≤ T − σi) and at the same time
∑k
`=1 zC`,` > yi. For a
specified i, finding a configuration C that induces a violated constraint can be
seen as finding a k-sequence given by a solution to our knapsack variant: [m]0
is the item set (over which j ranges), the value for placing item j at location
` is zj,`, item j’s cost is αj , and the penalty for location ` is w`. The given
value lower bound is yi, and T − σi is the given upper bound on the penalized
cost. Effectively, we use the possibly-tighter weight bound min{Wαm−1, T−σi}
instead, as Wαm−1 bounds the overall cost obtainable with a length-k sequence.
As now the weight bound is polynomial in αm−1 and W , the solution to our
knapsack variant becomes polynomial.
We repeat this knapsack-solving step for each i until we find a violated
constraint, or conclude that no constraint is violated. Once we have solved the
dual using the ellipsoid method with the separation oracle, we continue in a
similar fashion to the proof of Theorem 9.
7 Algorithm for WCM
Solve the above mentioned configuration-LP formulation as described in Sec-
tion 6. As both constraints will be equalities, for each candidate ci, we treat the
xi,C ’s as a distribution over the configurations for i since
∑
C∈Ci(T ) xi,C = 1,
and randomly choose one according to that distribution. For the time being,
give i this configuration.
As for UCM, every candidate now has a valid configuration but constraints
may still be violated; it is possible that the number of scores of a certain type
αj given by a specific voter ` is not exactly 1. Formally, fix a specific voter `;
we let the array H such that H[j] = |{i | Ci` = j}| be histogram of the scores
with respect to `. It is then possible that H[j] 6= 1. Our goal, as before, is to
fix this without introducing too much of an addition to the candidates’ overall
scores. However, there is now some added complexity due to the necessity to
preserve the identity of the voter when fixing a specific score given.
Let t = (i, `, j) be a tuple representing the event that candidate ci received
a score of αj from voter ` in its configuration. Fix a manipulator `, and place
all tuples having ` as their respective voter in a set A, that is A = {(i, `, Ci`) |
i = 1, . . . ,m}. Sort A according to each tuple (i, `, Ci`)’s score-index Ci`, and let
L = 〈t1, . . . , tm〉 be the resulting list. Notice that any tuple tj = (i, `, j′) in L
represents the event that currently Ci` = j
′. Now change Ci` such that C
i
` ← j.
In words, Ci` gets the rank of its respective tuple in the sorted list L. In effect,
the score awarded to ci by ` changes from αj′ to αj .
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Algorithm 2: WCM Approximation algorithm.
1 Solve the C-LP as described in Section 6
2 foreach i do define distribution q s.t. q(C) = xi,C for all C ∈ Ci(T ) and
randomly choose Ci ∼ q.
3 for `← 1 to k do
4 Let A = {(i, `, Ci`) | i = 1, . . . ,m} /* tuple (i, `, j) represnts the
event the ` awarded αj to ci */
5 Sort A in an ascending order by ScoreIndex(·) and let
L = 〈t0, . . . , tm−1〉 be the resulting list. /* ScoreIndex(t) = j if
t = (i, `, j) */
6 for j ← 0 to m− 1 do
7 Observe tuple tj = (i, `, j
′).
8 Ci` ← j /* this assigns the score αj to ci, instead of
the previous αj′ */
9 return the resulting manipulation matrix [C1; · · · ;Cm] /* place Ci as
the i-th column vector of the resulting matrix */
We repeat the above process for each voter. Notice that now every score is
repeated k times, one by each voter. The process is summarized as Algorithm 2.
As before, let β = d
√
m logm for some constant d and let g(~α) = maxi=0,...,m−β αi+β−
αi.
Lemma 15. Let C ∈ {C1, . . . , Cm} be a configuration obtained for some can-
didate by the rounding process, and let C ′ be its corrected version given by the
process described above. Then with arbitrary-chosen polynomially-small failure
probability,
m−1∑
j=0
αjC
′
j ≤
m−1∑
j=0
αjCj +W · g(~α) .
.
Proof. Fix a specific voter `. Let H be the histogram with respect to voter `
over the original configurations C1, . . . , Cm, i.e. H[j] = |{i | Ci` = j}|. Let
the array G be the array of histogram partial sums, i.e., G[j] =
∑j
j′=0H[j
′] =
|{i | Ci` ≤ j}|. We also define Di[j] to be a Bernoulli variable which is equal
to 1 if Ci` ≤ j, and 0 otherwise. We will show that with high probability,
G[j] ≤ (j + 1) + d√m lnm.
Fix a specific j. Notice that
E[G[j]] =
j∑
j′=0
E[H[j′]] =
j∑
j′=0
∑
i,C
C∈Ci(T )
C`=j
′
xi,C = j + 1
according to the LP constraints, and that G[j] =
∑m
i=1D
i[j], that is, G[j] is a
random variable which is the sum of the independent random variables Di[j] ∈
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{0, 1} for i = 1, . . . ,m. Therefore, using the ‘classic’ Hoeffding inequality:
Pr [G[j]− E[G[j]] ≥ λ] ≤ e− 2λ
2
m .
Setting λ = d′
√
m lnm, for some arbitrary constant d′, we get that Pr[G[j] −
E[G[j]] ≥ d′√m lnm] ≤ 1/md′ , that is, the probability that we deviate from
E[G[j]] by more than O˜(
√
m) can be made arbitrarily polynomially small. Using
the union bound, the same can be made to hold for all j = 0, . . . ,m − 1 and
` = 1, . . . , k simultaneously.
Now observe a tuple tj = (i, `, j
′) before being possibly corrected by the
algorithm. Since its rank j in the sorted sequence is at most the number of
scores given by ` whose type is at most j′, which is by definition G[j′], we get
that j ≤ G[j′] ≤ (j′ + 1) + d′√m lnm, where the second inequality holds with
high probability. Therefore by the algorithm changing the score αj′ to αj , the
score increases by at most αj − αj′ ≤ α(j′+1)+d′√m lnm − αj′ ≤ g(~α).
Now observe some candidate ci with a given configuration C
i corrected to
become a configuration C ′ by the algorithm. Since at worst case, all of ci’s
k scores where affected as such, her overall score has increased by at most∑k
`=1(w`g(~α)) = Wg(~α).
Corollary 16. The above algorithm provides an additive Wg(~α) approximation
with high probability. By repeating the randomized rounding procedure a linear
number of times, the failure probability becomes exponentially-small. The overall
running time is polynomial.
Proof. Identical to the proof of Corollary 11, the only difference being W used
instead of k.
From here we can directly obtain Corollary 4:
Proof of Corollary 4. By noticing that for Borda, g(~α) = O(
√
m logm).
8 Implementation
We implemented our algorithm for the case for Borda-UCM and Borda-WCM
and uploaded the code to a public repository7. The main subroutine is solving
the LP duals that we have defined. However, the dependency on an LP solver
using the ellipsoid method with a separation oracle proved difficult as to the
best of our knowledge there is no library which enables solving an LP this way.
Instead we simulated this by using a general LP-solving library [1, 20] and
running the separation oracle externally as described in Algorithm 3.
7https://github.com/okeller/BordaManipulation
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Algorithm 3: Simulating the ellipsoid method with a separation oracle.
Input: A linear program P = (f, S) with an objective function f and a
separation oracle S (instead of an explicit list of constraits)
1 Let R← ∅ /* R will be a list of effective constraints */
2 Let P ′ ← (f,R) /* P ′ is P without any constraints */
3 ~x← LP-solve(P ′)
4 while S(~x) returns a violated constraint r do
5 R← R ∪ {r}
6 P ′ ← (f,R)
7 ~x← LP-solve(P ′)
8 return ~x
8.1 Practical Heuristics
We used the following heuristics in our implementation:
• We obtained a running-time speedup was modifying the separation oracle
to return a set of violated constraints, one for each i (if such exists),
instead of a single violated constraint, and adding all of them to the list
of constraints.
• When sorting by the score index after the rounding part, we broke ties
between tuples having the same score in favor of the candidate with the
higher current score. This way, candidates with lower score are more likely
to have a score index awarded to them increased by the fixing procedure.
• Our practical running time is dominated by solving the C-LP. Therefore,
we can perform the randomized part of rounding process several times,
and pick the best one, while incurring only a negligible overhead to the
runtime.
9 Experiments
9.1 Experimental Setting
To evaluate our algorithms for both UCM and WCM in a well-studied setting,
we have run experiments for Borda-UCM and Borda-WCM on sets of values
for n, k and m (choice of values will be explained shortly). For the unweighted
case, our algorithm was compared to Average Fit that was shown empirically
to outperform reverse [8]. For the weighted case, as we are not aware of a
generalization of Average Fit to a weighted setting, we compared against
reverse.
We have chosen n = 2k, as having one manipulator for every two original
voters represents a sweet-spot where manipulators have enough power to change
outcomes, but not too much; for each n, k,m combination, we have run 20
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experiments in which we have drawn the non-manipulator votes from a uniform
distribution. We have chosen k ≈ √m or smaller, as our algorithms are suited
for low k values: as mentioned, our algorithm for Borda-UCM is theoretically
competitive when k = o(
√
m/ logm), and we have wished to verify this also in
an empirical setting. Lower k values are also the cases which are more difficult
to Average Fit heuristic of [8].
9.2 Borda-UCM
We are comparing our results to those obtained by Average Fit, and to the
fractional solution, TCLP. The results are summarized in Figure 1. As can be
seen, our algorithm performs well in practice. In the many of the cases, both
the C-LP and Average Fit were known to be identical to the optimal solution,
as depicted in Figure 1a: these are the instances in which the C-LP solution
did not increase when performing the LP rounding. Therefore, in those cases
we know what is the real optimal solution, as TCLP (resp. our final algorithm
result) provides a lower (resp. an upper) bound for it, and both are equal. Thus
our formulation in many times provides a very efficient method for verifying
whether our algorithm (or any other algorithm) finds an optimal solution.
In cases where the C-LP solution increased when performing the LP round-
ing, C-LP tends to be better than Average Fit on small k values, and worse
on larger ones. This is depicted in Figures 1b and 1c. For instance, consider
our example from before, this time with p: k = 2, m = 5 and (σ0, . . . , σ5) =
(0, 5, 6, 6, 6, 7). Obviously both methods will award p with 5 + 5 = 10. However
in ours the top score of a candidate who is not p will be 10, and in Average
Fit it is 12. Therefore, the choice of algorithm determines if p wins or not by
a difference of 2.
9.3 Borda-WCM
For the weighted case, as Average Fit has no weighted generalization, our
competitor is the weighted variant of reverse. Here the results were much
more conclusive: we experimented with the same type of values, choosing the
manipulator weights randomly from {1, 2}. The reasoning behind this was to
explore the weighted case on one hand, but on the other hand not to give any one
manipulator excessive power over others by giving him a large weight. As the
similar tables show (Figure 2), our algorithm beats reverse on any instance.
10 Conclusions
We have presented additive approximations to the score of the highest-scoring
non-preferred candidate in general scoring rules. It enables us to find a winning
strategy for p in cases where other methods would not necessarily have found
one. Our method employs new techniques based on configuration linear pro-
grams. There are several interesting directions for future work, which vary from
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(a) Number of cases for various value of m and k (out of 20 experiments carried out
for each m, k), where our algorithm provided results equal to the fractional solution
TCLP (and therefore, to the optimum T
∗).
(b) Number of cases for various value of m and k (out of 20 experiments carried out
for each m, k), where the C-LP method provided strictly better results compared to
Average Fit.
(c) Number of cases for various value of m and k (out of 20 experiments carried out
for each m, k), where the Average Fit provided strictly better results compared to
the C-LP method.
Figure 1: Experimental results for Borda-UCM.
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(a) Number of cases for various value of m and k (out of 20 experiments carried out
for each m, k), where our algorithm provided results equal to the fractional solution
TCLP (and therefore, to the optimum T
∗).
(b) Number of cases for various value of m and k (out of 20 experiments carried out
for each m, k), where the C-LP method provided strictly better results compared to
reverse.
(c) Number of cases for various value of m and k (out of 20 experiments carried out
for each m, k), where reverse provided strictly better results compared to the C-LP
method.
Figure 2: Experimental results for Borda-WCM.
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the concrete to the general:
1. Understand in which instances different manipulation strategies outper-
form others.
2. Find algorithms that can guarantee victory even if the margin is smaller,
or prove NP-hardness even if there is a solution with margin O(
√
m).
3. Apply a C-LP to other voting methods.
4. Apply a C-LP to other problems in computational social choice, such as
fair division of multiple indivisible goods.
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